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***Oarecare* Indefinites and Free Choice in Romanian**[*]

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In this paper I argue that Romanian *un NP oarecare* is a Hamblin indefinite which, unlike regular indefinites, induces domain widening (cf. Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) proposal for German *irgendein*). In modal environments, *un NP oarecare* acquires a free choice reading that comes about via a conversational implicature. This leads to the expectation that in downward entailing contexts like negation, the free choice effect is suspended. However, *un NP oarecare* cannot occur in the scope of clausemate negation unless it is focused. It will be shown that the resistance of unfocused *oarecare* to clausemate negation follows from the fact that *un NP oarecare* is a Positive Polarity Item in Romanian. It will also be argued that sentences in which focused *oarecare* co-occurs with negation are to be read as instances of implicature denials.

Key words: conversational implicature, domain widening, focus, free choice (indefinites), (Hamblin) indefinites, implicature denial, positive polarity items.

0. Introduction

Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), Kratzer (2006) discuss the behavior of the German indefinite *irgendein* and show that in certain contexts it acquires a free choice interpretation. They argue that *irgendein* is an indefinite which is different from the regular indefinite *ein* in that it induces domain widening; the free choice effect is derived in their framework via a conversational implicature.

In this paper I attempt two things: (i) I show that Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and Kratzer (2006)'s proposal, which I outline in section 3, can also account for the behavior of the Romanian free choice indefinite *un NP oarecare*; (ii) I discuss in detail the interaction between the indefinite and clausemate negation.

More specifically, I will argue that *un NP oarecare* is an indefinite which introduces into the discourse a set of individual alternatives which keep expanding until they meet an existential operator that can bind them. I argue that just like *irgendein, un NP oarecare* induces domain widening; the free choice reading that we notice in certain modal contexts is obtained from the

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interaction between the semantics of the modal and the conversational inferences which result from the domain widening induced by *un NP oarecare* (section 4.1).

In section 4.2 I discuss and eliminate a potential problem for my analysis, which arises from the interaction between *un NP oarecare* and clausemate negation. The crucial argument that supports the claim that the free choice effect with *irgendein* is a conversational implicature is that in downward entailing contexts in German, the conversational implicature is suspended and *irgendein* behaves like a regular negative polarity item (NPI). Under the present set up, if we are right that the free choice effect with *un NP oarecare* comes about via a conversational implicature, then we would expect that the free choice effect is suspended if the indefinite is under the immediate scope of negation. However, the expectation is not met in Romanian. The free choice indefinite *cannot* occur with clausemate negation *unless* (i) either negation is focused or (ii) *oarecare* receives focal stress. Moreover, in these contexts, the free choice effect of *oarecare* is retained.

A closer investigation of the environments in which *un NP oarecare* can occur in Romanian leads me to suggest that the indefinite is actually a Positive Polarity Item (henceforth PPI) in the language (section 4.3). This conclusion is supported by the fact that *un NP oarecare* has the same distribution as regular PPIs in Romanian, which do not occur immediately under clausemate negation (except for cases of rescuing in the sense of Szabolcsi 2004) but do occur under merely decreasing operators. Crucially for the current proposal, when *un NP oarecare* does indeed occur in these latter downward entailing contexts, the free choice effect is indeed suspended. This, together with the inferences generated by the fact that *un NP oarecare* is a domain widening indefinite, leads me to conclude that the free choice effect that we witness with *un NP oarecare* is indeed a conversational implicature[1].

In section 4.4 I return to the interaction between focused *un NP oarecare* and the negation operator. I suggest that sentences in which focused *un NP oarecare* occurs in the immediate scope of negation are to be read as instances of implicature denials.

Previous accounts of the free choice field in Romanian (Farkas 2002, Farkas 2005) have not dealt with *un NP oarecare* in Romanian, but have mainly focused on either universal free choice items like *orice, oricare* or on the existential free choice item *vreun*. The novelty of this paper, then, consists in two facts: (i) it offers an account of the free choice effect which arises with *un NP oarecare* in modal contexts, thus providing further descriptive support for Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and Kratzer (2006) account of German *irgendein* and (ii) it sheds light on the rather intricate interaction between *un NP oarecare* and negation.

I begin with a brief summary of the investigation of the free choice field in Romanian, as put forth in Farkas (2005). My data will be outlined in section 2.

1. The Free Choice Field in Romanian. Farkas (2005)

Farkas (2005) discusses the determiner corner of the free choice land in Romanian, a language in which the work done by English *any* is carried out by several more specialized items; some of these have an existential free choice flavor while others acquire a universal free choice interpretation.

Her account is couched in what Horn (1999) calls *quodlibetic* theories, and it claims that the unifying characteristic of both universal and existential free choice items (FCIs) is the fact that they denote a maximal set of undifferentiated alternatives that verify the expression in which the item occurs.

FC universals

The role of universal *any* in Romanian is done by morphologically complex items in the *ori* series. They are formed of the morpheme *ori* and an interrogative pronoun: *ce* (‘*what’*), *cine* (‘*who’*) or *care* (‘*which’*) and fall into two categories: (i) unmarked FCIs (*orice (NP)* and *oricine),* which do not impose any requirement on their domain and (ii) D-linked FCIs (*oricare (NP))*, which require their domain to be contextually established. Some of the environments in which these FCIs can occur are exemplified below:

(1) ***Orice*** *bufniţă* *vâneză* *şoareci.*
o-any owl hunts mice
‘Any owl hunts mice’.
(Farkas 2005, ex.5)

(2) *Bob* *poate* *sări* ***orice*** *gard.*
Bob can jump o-any fence
‘Bob can jump any fence’.

(3) ***Oricine*** *ştie* *că* *Pământul* *e* *rotund.*
o-who knows that Earth.the is round
‘Anybody knows that the Earth is round’.

(4) ***Oricare*** *student* *de* *aici* *poate* *pleca.*
o-any student of here can leave
‘Any student here can leave’.

As Farkas (2005) notes, ‘the domain constraint that comes with D-linked FCIs is met either when the domain of the NP is contextually present or when it is defined relative to a contextually present entity […]. If the non D-linked version is used, the domain may be completely open, or it may be implicitly restricted to a relevant set’ (p.6,7).

FC existentials

Existential *any* is exemplified in Romanian by the indefinite *vreun/vreo* and the set of n-determiners.

In the realm of n-words, Romanian, a negative concord language, distinguishes both determiners and pronouns. N-determiners are formed of *nici* and the singular form of the indefinite article: *un* (masc, sg)/ *o* (fem.sg). These can occur both in the immediate scope of negation (5) and within the scope of a negative adverb (6):

(5) *Nu* *am* *văzut* ***nici*** *un* *băiat.*
not have seen n a boy
‘I haven’t seen any boy’.
(Farkas 2005, ex.2)

(6) *A* *plecat* *fără* ***nici*** *o* *explicaţie*.
has left without n a explanation.
‘He left without any explanation’.

Vreun/vreo indefinites are morphologically related to the unmarked indefinite article in Romanian, but they contrast with unmarked indefinites in that they have a more restricted distribution, that is, they only occur in downward entailing contexts (to the exclusion of negation and negative adverbs): antecedents of conditionals (7), interrogatives (8), restrictions of universal

quantifiers (9). Moreover, they can never have wide scope and are not associated with a specific interpretation:

(7) *Dacă vezi* ***vreun*** *student trişînd, spune-mi.*
if see.2sg v-any student cheating, tell me
'If you see any student cheating, tell me'.
(Farkas 2005, ex 4)

(8) *Ai văzut* ***vreun*** *porc care zboară*?
have.2sg seen v-any pig which flies
'Have you seen any pig that flies?'
(Farkas 2005, ex 15)

(9) *Fiecare student care are* ***vreo*** *plângere va fi ignorat.*
every student who has v-any complaint will be ignored
'Every student that has any complaint will be ignored'.

Farkas (2005) suggests that what all these FCIs (whether existential or universal) have in common is "the fact that their interpretation involves a set of *maximal non-differentiated alternatives*" (p. 10).

These alternatives, she notes, are assignment function/situation pairs which differ in the entity assigned to the variable contributed by the FCI and they are maximal within the limits of contextual linguistic or non linguistic restrictions. The alternatives need to be verifying in that all values must be witnesses for the expression α in which the FCI occurs. "The undifferentiated nature of these alternatives with respect to verifying α is responsible for what Horn calls, following Hamilton, the *quodlibetic* nature of FC" (p.10)

If the FCI has widest scope, then it acquires universal force; when this is the case, all the alternatives it introduces are relevant to the interpretation of α. FCIs with an existential interpretation are in the scope of an existential quantifier; FC existentials involve the choice of only one alternative, but the choice of this alternative is immaterial.

Farkas (2005) further suggests, following Giannakidou (2001), that FCIs are subject to the Modal Alternation Condition, which states that " witnesses of a variable introduced by a FCI must co-vary with a situation-world variable" (p. 10). Thus, the variable that comes with the FCI must be in the scope of an operator binding a situation/world variable.

As such, the following picture emerges of the FC field in Romanian:

(i) *nici* indefinites are marked by the feature [Neg] and [FC]; the former marks them as negative concord items, while the latter introduces a set of alternatives;

(ii) *vreun* indefinites are marked [FC] and [∃]; following Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), the suggestion with Farkas (2005) is that the [∃] feature is a licensing feature which requires that the indefinite be in the scope of an existential quantifier.

(iii) the [FC] feature with items in the *ori* series is contributed by *ori.* When *ori* combines with the interrogative pronoun *care,* then the FC *oricare* is specified as [D-linked]; when *ori* combines with *ce* or *cine,* the domain of FCIs may be contextually restricted only if this restriction is salient in the discourse.

Farkas (2005), however, does not discuss the existential free choice item *un/o NP oarecare,* which I exemplify in (10) below:

(10) *Maria poate să rezolve o problemă* ***oarecare.***
Mary can s SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary can solve any problem'.

To my knowledge, *un NP oarecare* has only been addressed in previous literature by Farkas (2002b), who only notes that 'this type of indefinite is used to enforce a scopally non specific reading'; the role of *oarecare* is to signal that "an ordinary indefinite is interpreted as quodlibetic, i.e., that the choice of the value is immaterial" (p.6).

In what follows, I provide a more detailed investigation of the behavior of the existential FC *un NP oarecare* in Romanian. I remain uncommitted as to whether Farkas's framework could also account for the free choice reading of *un NP oarecare.* Instead, following Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) and Kratzer's (2006) analysis of the German FC indefinite *irgendein,* I adopt a Hamblin Semantics of alternatives and I show that the FC reading of *un NP oarecare* is derived via a conversational implicature.

2. Un NP oarecare.

2.1 The data.

The indefinite *un NP oarecare* contains the indefinite article *un (o)* and the morphological complex determiner *oarecare,* which is made up from the interrogative pronoun *care* ('which') and the particle *oare.* The indefinite is typically used to (i) mark a speaker's overt lack of knowledge as to who or what satisfies the existential claim or (ii) to signal that any individual in the domain of discourse can satisfy the existential claim[2] or (iii) to suggest that the speaker thinks disparagingly of one particular individual.

Consider, to begin with, the following exchange:

(11) A: *Cine a bătut la poartă*?
who has knocked at door
'Who knocked at the door?'

B: *Era un student* ***oarecare,*** *care - l căuta pe tata.*
was a student whatever who him was looking PE daddy
'It was some student or other who was looking for daddy.'

A speaker who uses *oarecare* in this context can overtly signal either (i) that he belittles the student or (ii) that he doesn't know who the student was. In the latter reading, the use of the regular indefinite would also have been possible in the exchange, but then A could have asked for more information as to the identity of the student:

(12) B: *Era* ***un*** *student, care - l căuta pe tata.*
was a student, who him was looking PE daddy
'It was a student who was looking for daddy.'

A: *Cine era studentul?*
who was student.the
'Who was the student?'

Such a continuation would have been impossible in (11).

The same readings obtain if *oarecare* appears before the noun. When this is the case, there is a strong intuition that the speaker may actually know who the relevant student was, but he does not want to reveal his identity.

When *un NP oarecare* appears in a modal, intensional environment, the sentence acquires a free choice reading as well: any individual in the domain could satisfy the claim made. The free choice reading, however, is not available if *oarecare* precedes the noun.

Consider, for exemplification, (13) – (18) below; for each sentence, I illustrate all the possible readings:

(13) Conditionals:
Dacă pui o carte ***oarecare*** *pe raft , se va prăbuşi imediat.*
if put.2sg a book whatever on shelf, refl will collapse immediately
'If you put some book on the shelf, it will collapse immediately.'

(14) Imperatives:
Alege o rochie oarecare!
choose a dresss whatever
(i) 'Choose any dress!'
(ii) 'Choose a plain dress!'

(15) Habituals:
Maria invită de obicei un bărbat ***oarecare*** *la petrecerile ei*.
Mary invites usually a man whatever at parties her
(i) 'Mary usually invites a certain man to her parties, but the speaker does not remember who that is, or maybe he does not care who the man is.'
(ii) 'Mary usually invites a man to her party, and any man could be a possible choice for Mary.'
(iii)'Mary usually invites a certain man to her parties, and the speaker does not think highly of Mary's guest.'

(16) Permission modals:
Poate să vină un copil ***oarecare*** *la petrecere.*
can SĂ come a kid whatever at party
(i) 'A certain kid is allowed to come; the speaker does not care about or remember which one.'
(ii) 'Some kid or other is allowed to come/can come, any kid is a possible option.'

(17) Ability modals:
Maria poate să rezolve o problemă ***oarecare.***
Mary can SĂ solve a problem whatever
(i) 'There is a certain problem that Mary can solve; the speaker does not know which problem it is.'
(ii) 'No matter what problem Mary is faced with, she is able to solve it.'

(18) Necessity modals:
Maria trebuie să se căsătorească cu un doctor ***oarecare*** *din sat.*
Mary must SĂ refl marry with a doctor whatever from village

(i) 'There is a certain doctor that Marry has to marry, but the speaker does not know about or doesn't know who he is.'
(ii) 'Mary has to marry some doctor or other, any doctor is a possible choice.'
(iii) 'There is a certain doctor that Mary has to marry, but the speaker does not think highly about the doctor.'

In what follows, for reasons of space, I will only focus on the free choice reading of *un NP oarecare.* I remain uncommitted, however, as to whether the pejorative reading could actually be derived from free choice or whether it is an independent reading altogether. One possibility, which has been suggested to me by Anna Szabolcsi (pc), would be to say that not considering someone's identity as important, or relevant, is derogatory[3]. I leave the issue for further investigation.

2.1.1 Back to Free Choice.

Consider again the free choice reading of the sentence in (17) above:

(17) *Maria poate să rezolve o problemă* ***oarecare****.*
Mary can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'No matter what problem Mary is faced with, she is able to solve it.'

It is important to note at this point that the free choice reading arises if the relevant domain is not restricted in any way, that is, it has to be as wide as it can possible be. If our domain contains, say, 250 problems, it has to be the case that no matter which problem from the *total* set of 250 problems Mary is faced with, she will be able to solve that problem. As such, the sentence would be infelicitous in a scenario in which she could solve, say, only a subset containing 200 problems. However, we would still be able to make the statement that Mary can, actually, solve a problem, but a regular indefinite would have to be used instead:

(19) *Maria poate să rezolve* ***o*** *problemă.*
Mary can SĂ solve a problem
'Mary can solve a problem.'

One issue, which has been pointed out to me by Donka Farkas (pc) is that it is possible, in (17) for Mary to be able to solve any problem in a *given,* salient set of, say, math problems, but she may not be actually able to solve advanced quantum physics problems.

Similarly, in a scenario in which somebody shows me a basket of apples and uses *oarecare* to signal that there is no restriction on my choice of apples, it does not actually follow from what the speaker tells me that I am free to choose an apple from his orchard, for instance. Rather, what the Speaker intends me to understand is that I can choose any apple *from* the *basket.* It may be the case that the maximality of our domain is actually to be understood relative to the *maximal relevant topic situation* (cf Kratzer 2004). In the apple scenario, this translates into a situation containing the Speaker, the Hearer and the apples in the basket. The suggestion, I believe, could also accommodate cases in which the maximal topic situation is the actual world; when this is indeed the case, no restriction whatsoever occurs.

Alternatively, we could suggest that this constitutes a case where situational restriction and predicate/variable restriction are distinguished[4]; as such, *oarecare* could come with a situational restriction (say, the apples *in the basket)*, but not with a predicate/variable restriction (the apples that are *green).*

2.2 ***Un NP oarecare*** *has a twin in German.*

The behavior of the Romanian indefinite exemplified above is strikingly similar to that of the German indefinite *irgendein,* as described by Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002). Just like *un NP oarecare, irgendein* is used in affirmative contexts to suggest the speaker's lack of knowledge regarding the identity of the individual satisfying the claim; in modal contexts, *irgendein* acquires a free choice reading:

(20) ***Irgend****jemand hat angerufen.*
irgend-one has called
'Somebody or other has called.' (I don't know, or I don't care who)
(cf. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002:10, ex 6)

(21) ***Irgendein*** *Kind kann sprechen.*
irgend-one child can talk
(i) 'Some particular child is able/allowed to talk - the speaker doesn't remember or care about which one.'
(ii) 'Some child or other is permitted to talk, any child is a permitted option.'
(Kratzer 2006:23)

(22) *Mary musste* ***irgendeinen*** *Mann heiraten.*
Mary had to irgend-one man marry
(i) 'There was some man Mary had to marry, the speaker does not know or care who it was.'
(ii) 'Mary had to marry a man and any man could be a possible choice for her.'

Just like in the Romanian examples discussed above, when the indefinite triggers free choice effects, it has to be the case that our domain be maximal: as such, (22) would have been inappropriate in a context in which Mary had to marry one of two doctors, as long as our domain contained more than two doctors. In such a scenario, the Speaker would have to use the indefinite *ein Mann*:

(23) *Mary musste* ***einen*** *Mann heiraten*
Mary had to a man marry
'Mary had to marry a man.'

So far, so good. It looks as if un NP oarecare has a twin in German.

2.3 Negation makes a difference!

There is, however, a difference between the two indefinites. Unlike German *irgendein,* which can co-occur with a clausemate negative quantifier, *un NP oarecare* can only appear in the immediate scope of negation if it is focused[5]. Compare:

(24) *Niemand musste* ***irgend****jemand einlanden*
nobody had to irgend-one marry
'Nobody had to marry anybody.'
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002: 14)

(25) **Maria nu poate să rezolve o problemă* ***oarecare.***
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve any problem.'

When *oarecare* is focused, the sentence is fine (26). However, the interpretation is not that Mary cannot solve any problems, but rather, that she cannot solve just any problem:

(26) *Maria nu poate să rezolve o problemă OARECARE*$_{+focus}$.
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

In what follows I will argue that despite the distributional difference just noted between *un NP oarecare* and German *irgendein,* the Romanian facts can be understood in the light of Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) treatment of German *irgendein*. I begin with a brief overview of their proposal.

3. Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)

With Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), the German indefinite *irgendein* is a Hamblin indefinite, which introduces a set of individual alternatives that expand via functional application into propositional alternatives.

The free choice effect which is available with *irgendein* is a direct consequence of its special relation with modality. Previously before Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), Dayal (1998), Giannakidou (2001), Saebø (2001) have also shown that the connection between modalized contexts and free choice indefinites is the key to understanding the free choice. In Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) framework, the free choice effect that we witness with *irgendein* is the result of the interaction between the modal operating on the set of propositional alternatives introduced by *irgendein* and the inferences generated by the fact that the indefinite *irgendein* induces domain widening.

Before showing how the free choice effect is arrived at, let us see what the semantics of the indefinite looks like. In this framework, DPs headed by *ein* denote a subset of their common noun set. *Ein Mann ('a man')* denotes a subset of the set of men Thus, for all possible worlds w and variable assignment functions g, picking a subset of D, we get:

(27) $g(D) \subseteq D$ D=the set of all possible individuals
$[[\text{ ein}_D \text{ Mann}]]^{w,g} = \{x: x \text{ is a man in w } \& \ x \in g(D)\}$

Unlike a regular indefinite, *irgendein* induces *widening* of the domain. As such, *irgendein Mann* cannot denote a proper subset of the set of men, but it has to denote the set of *all* men. Thus, for any world w, variable assignment functions g and g', and $[[\alpha]] \subseteq D_e$ we have:

(28) $[[\text{irgend } -\alpha]]w,g = \{x: \exists g'[x \in [[\alpha]]w, g' \}$, where $g(D) \subseteq g'(D)$
$[[\text{irgend [einD man] }]]w,g = \{x: \exists g'[x \text{ is a man in w and } x \in g'(D)]\}$

The alternatives created by *irgendein* expand next into propositional alternatives, by combining with predicates via functional application.

In Kratzer and Shimoyama's system, modals operate on singleton sets of propositional alternatives and their scope is immediately closed by an existential operator. *Irgendein* indefinites have no quantificational force of their own, but, being lexically specified as existentials, need to agree with a matching ∃ operator, which gets introduced together with the modal. If *irgendein* combines with a possibility modal, then the semantics of the modal says that some proposition in the alternative set it operates over is true in some accessible world; if *irgendein* occurs with a necessity modal, then the requirement is that some proposition in the alternative set be true for every accessible world. The alternatives created by the indefinite are then distributed over the set of the accessible worlds.

The important question is where this distributional requirement, which gives us the free choice effect, comes from. Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) suggestion is that the free choice effect with *irgendein* indefinites is derived as a conversational implicature, as the direct consequence of the fact that *irgendein* induces domain widening.

The facts are to be understood against the background of the domain widening hypothesis originally put forth more than a decade ago by Kadmon and Landman (1993) in order to explain the behavior of English *any.* With Kadmon and Landman, *any* is licensed only if the widening it induces creates a stronger statement; as such, NPI *any* is limited to downward entailing contexts.

With *irgendein,* things are, however, different, as Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) note. It cannot be that the reason why the speaker chooses a domain widening indefinite in a positive environment is because the speaker wants to make a stronger statement; in positive contexts, claims get weaker when domains for existentials widen.

Consider, thus, (29):

(29) *Du kannst dir* ***irgend****eins von diesen beiden Büchern leihen.*
You can you (Dat.) irgend-one of those two books borrow
'You can borrow any one of those books, it doesn't matter which'
(Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, ex. 16:19)

What (29) conveys is that any of the two books is a possible option. In our model, the absence of any restriction translates into the 'distributional requirement': for any proposition p in the alternative set S, there is a permitted world w in which the proposition p holds. Note, moreover, that if the speaker had chosen a smaller set of alternatives and had said, for instance: *You can choose 'Pride and Prejudice'*, he would have imposed a restriction on the possible choices that the Hearer has. Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) show that making a claim about a subset of the set of books in the context described above would have either (i) constituted a false claim, or (ii) would have led to a false exhaustive inference. It thus follows that by using a domain widening indefinite in (29) the speaker has chosen to make a weaker claim because he wanted to obey Grice's maxim of quality. Any other statement would have led to a violation of the maxim.

Let us see how Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) compute the implicature in (29). (For ease of exposition, I will consider that our relevant domain contains only two books: 'Pride and Prejudice' and 'Blindness'). The Hearer will understand that the Speaker did not make a more specific statement (*You can choose 'Pride and Prejudice'*) because he had a reason. Why would this be the case? The hearer may think as follows: the reason the Speaker did not make a claim about a specific book in the domain of discourse could be because the stronger claim: *You can choose 'Pride and Prejudice'* is false. Why didn't he, then, make a statement about 'Blindness' instead? This would be because the exhaustive inference *It is not the case that you can choose 'Pride and Prejudice'* would then turn out to be true, contrary to fact. Let's assume, then, that *You can choose 'Pride and Prejudice'* is true. The reason, however, why the speaker chose to make the weaker claim: *You can*

choose 'Pride and Prejudice' or 'Blindness' is because he wanted to avoid the false exhaustive inference *You cannot choose 'Blindness'*. We infer that if the Hearer can borrow 'Pride and Prejudice', then he can also borrow 'Blindness'. Following the same reasoning, as to why the Speaker did not pick the other smaller alternative set and said *You can borrow 'Blindness',* we conclude that if the Hearer could borrow 'Blindness' then he could also borrow 'Pride and Prejudice'. It thus follows that we can only make room for models in which all books are epistemic possibilities for the Hearer.

That the distributional requirement responsible for the FC effect with *irgendein* indefinites is a conversational implicature is supported in German by the fact that, like ordinary scalar implicatures discussed by Gazdar 1979, it is suspended under negation and, more generally, in downward entailing contexts:

(30) *Du kannst dir auf keinen fall* ***irgend****eins von diesen beiden Buchen leihen.*
you can you(dat) in no case irgend-one of those two books borrow
'In no case can you borrow any one of those two books.'

Kratzer and Shimoyama show that in trying to reconstruct why the widening of the domain took place in (30), we arrive at nothing that is not already logically implied by what the Speaker said. Let us say that the alternative set of propositions is S={p(A)= you borrow A, p(B)= you borrow B}. The truth conditional content of (30) is:

(31) ¬ P(ossible) (p(A) ∨ p(B)).

The question is: why didn't the speaker choose a smaller set of alternatives, say p(A)? It cannot be that the reason why the speaker did not say ¬ P(ossible) (p(A)) is because he thinks it is false. He cannot think that it is false, because it actually follows from what he said (see (31)). Assume, then, that the speaker knows that ¬ P(ossible) (p(A)) is true. Why didn't he, then, say "You cannot borrow A?" Could it be because had she said ¬ P(ossible) (p(A)), he wanted to suspend the exhaustive inference P(ossible) (p(B))? But the exhaustive inference *is* false, for ¬ P(ossible) (p(B)) follows from the truth conditional content in (31).

The total meaning of (30) is the same as its truth conditional statement, and trying to compute why widening took place does not lead to any statements beyond the ones that are logically implied by what it has actually been said. The implicature is thus suspended.

4. **The Analysis**

4.1 ***Un NP oarecare*** *as a domain widening indefinite.*

We have seen in our discussion in section 2. that Romanian *un NP oarecare,* just like German *irgendein,* can only be employed in a modal environment if all the entities in the relevant domain can satisfy the existential claim[6].

Consider, for further exemplification, (32) below:

(32) *Astă seară prinţesa poate să danseze cu un cavaler* ***oarecare****.*
this evening princess.the can SĂ dance with a knight whatever
'Tonight, the princess is allowed to dance with a knight at the ball, and any knight is an option for her.'

(32) can only be felicitously uttered if any knight is such that the princess is allowed to dance with him. If, for instance, her options were only unmarried knights, then using *oarecare* to the exclusion of married knights would amount to making a false claim. In order for (32) to be uttered truthfully, Mary's possibilities have to include the set of all knights, say married and unmarried alike.

In the framework adopted here, *un NP oarecare* introduces a set of individual alternatives. *Un cavaler oarecare* thus denotes the set of all knights. The individual alternatives introduced by the indefinite then expand into propositional alternatives and the modal quantifies over the set containing these propositions.

Recall that the semantics of a possibility modal requires that some proposition in the alternative set the modal operate over be true in some accessible world. Moreover, when hearing (32), we infer that there is no subset of the set of available knights that the princess cannot choose from. As such, following the proposal outlined in the previous section, we may want to conclude that the free choice effect present in (32) is derived via Gricean reasoning.

Things do not run smoothly, though. Let us see why.

4.2 Implicatures and negation. A problem?

We have seen in section 3 above that Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) crucial argument supporting the claim that the distributional requirement is a conversational implicature comes from the fact that this implicature is suspended if *irgendein* is in the scope of a negative quantifier or when it appears in downward entailing contexts; when this is the case, *irgendein* is interpreted as English NPI *any*[7].

Interestingly, however, *un NP oarecare* cannot occur in the scope of clausemate negation in Romanian unless either negation or *oarecare* is focused:

(33) *Maria NU poate să resolve o problemă oarecare.*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

(34) *Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă OARECARE.*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

(33) is typically used to negate the truth of a previously mentioned utterance. What (34) is telling us is that not any problem in our domain is such that Mary can solve it. I will return to these readings in section 4.4.

In order to get the interpretation that Mary solves no problems, an NPI (n-word) will have to be used instead; if unfocused *oarecare* is used, the sentence is ungrammatical:

(35) *Maria nu poate să resolve* ***nici*** *o problemă.*
Mary not can SĂ solve not a problem
'Mary cannot solve any problem.'

(36) **Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă* ***oarecare****.*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

We seem to be stuck. The conclusion of the previous section has been that the free choice effect induced by the use of the indefinite *un NP oarecare* in a modal context could be derived, following a proposal by Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) for German *irgendein,* via Gricean reasoning. If the free choice effect is indeed a conversational implicature, then we would expect that when *un NP oarecare* is embedded under negation, the implicature disappears. But we have seen that unfocused *oarecare* cannot occur under negation, to begin with! Is the free choice effect derived, then, in another way? Have we been wrong all along?

I argue that we haven't. A closer investigation of the Romanian facts shows that under the present set-up, the hypothesis that the free choice effect *is* a conversational implicature is actually tenable.

*4.3 **Un NP oarecare** is a Positive Polarity Item.*

I suggest that the reason why Romanian *un NP oarecare* resists clausemate negation is because it is a Positive Polarity Item (PPI). The fact that it doesn't co-occur with clausemate negation then falls out naturally.

That *un NP oarecare* is indeed a PPI can be seen from the fact that it has the same distribution as regular PPIs like *cineva* (*somebody*) in the language.

We have already seen that *un NP oarecare* resists clausemate negation. Similarly, *cineva* (*'somebody')* cannot take narrow scope under clausemate negation:

(37) **N-am văzut niciodată pe **cineva**.*
not have.1sg seen never PE somebody
'I have never seen anybody.'

Note, moreover, that both *cineva* and *un NP oarecare* cannot take scope under *fără ('without')*[8]*:*

(38) **Ion a venit la petrecere fără **cineva** (important).*
John has come at party without someone (important)
'John came to the party without anyone important.'

(39) **Ion a venit la petrecere fără o femeie **oarecare.***
John has come at party without a woman whatever
'John came to the party without any woman (whatsoever)'.

On the other hand, both *cineva* and *un NP oarecare* are actually happy in other downward entailing contexts:

Yes/No questions:

(40) *A venit **cineva?***
has come somebody
'Has anybody come?'

(41) *Rezolvă Maria o problemă **oarecare** de aici?*
solves Mary a problem whatever from here
'Does Mary solve some problem or other?'

Conditionals:

(42) *Dacă pui **ceva** pe raft, se va prăbuşi imediat.*
if put.2sg something on shelf, it will collapse immediately
'If you put something on the shelf, it will collapse immediately'.

(43) *Dacă pui o carte **oarecare** pe raft , se va prabuşi imediat.*
if put.2sg a book whatever on shelf, it will collapse immediately
'If you put any book on the shelf, it will collapse immediately'[9].

Few:

(44) *Puţini copii au rezolvat **ceva** din manual.*
few kids have solved something from textbook
'Few kids have solved something from the textbook.'

(45) *Puţini copii resolvă o problemă **oarecare** din manual.*
few kids solve a problem whatever from textbook
'Few kids can solve at least one problem from the textbook'.

Superordinate negation*:*

(46) *Nu pretind că Maria a rezolvat **ceva** din manual.*
not claim.I that Mary has solved something from textbook
'I don't claim that Mary has solved something from the textbook'.

(47) *Nu pretind că Maria a rezolvat o problemă **oarecare** din manual.*
not claim that Mary has solved a problem whatever from textbook
'I don't claim that Mary solved a problem from the textbook.'

Dubitatives

(48) *Mă îndoiesc că Maria poate să resolve **ceva.***
I doubt that Mary can SĂ solve something
'I doubt that Mary can solve something'

(49) *Mă îndoiesc că Maria poate să lucreze pe un calculator **oarecare**.*
I doubt that Mary can SA work on a computer whatever
'I doubt that Mary can work on some computer or other.'

Negative factives:

(50) *Imi pare rău că Maria rezolvă **ceva** din manual.*
me seems bad that Mary solves something from textbook
'I am sorry that Mary solves something from the textbook.'

(51) *Imi pare rău că Maria rezolvă o problemă **oarecare** din manual.*
me seems bad that Mary solves a problem whatever from textbook
'I am sorry that Mary solves a problem from the textbook.'

Crucially, the contexts exemplified in (40) – (51) above *are* contexts in which conversational implicatures are suspended. It is easy to see that by trying to compute why the domain widening indefinite *un NP oarecare* and not a regular indefinite has been employed in these sentences does not lead to any inferences that are not already logically implied by what is being said. As such, the FC implicature is suspended.

Note, moreover, that when *un NP oarecare* occurs in environments that license weak type NPIs, it *can* scope directly below clausemate negation. Szabolcsi (2004) shows that certain PPI do

not occur in the scope of anti-additive operators [AA-OP], unless [AA-OP] is itself in an NPI licensing context. As such, weak (*ever*-type) NPIs rescue the PPI and enable it to scope under negation. The Romanian facts exemplified in (52)-(57) below thus provide further empirical support to Szabolcsi's (2004) generalization:

Antecedents of conditionals: OK: if> *(not >oarecare/cineva)*

(52) *Dacă nu rezolvi o problemă* ***oarecare****, e grav.*
if not solve.2sg a problem whatever is serious
'If you don't solve a problem, things become serious.'

(53) *Dacă nu rezolvi* ***ceva****, e grav.*
if not solve.2sg something, is serious
'If you don't solve something, things become serious.'

Restrictions of universal quantifiers: OK: every> *(not>oarecare/ceva)*

(54) *Fiecare copil care nu rezolvă o problemă* ***oarecare*** *din manual va fi pedepsit.*
every boy that not solve a problem whatever from textbook will be punished
'Every kid that doesn't solve a problem from the textbook will be punished.'

(55) *Fiecare copil care nu rezolvă* ***ceva*** *din manual, va fi pedepsit.*
every kid who not solves something from textbook will be punished
'Every kid that doesn't solve something from the textbook will be punished.'

Only OK: *only>(not >oarecare/ceva)*

(56) *Doar Ion nu a rezolvat o problemă* ***oarecare*** *din manual.*
only John not has solved a problem whatever from textbook
'Only John did not solve a problem from textbook.'

(57) *Doar Ion nu a rezolvat* ***ceva*** *din manual.*
only John not has solved something from textbook
'Only John did not solve something from the textbook.'

The fact that *un NP oarecare* cannot appear in the scope of clausemate negation is thus accounted for by the fact that *un NP oarecare* is a PPI in Romanian.

I conclude that Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) analysis of the German indefinite *irgendein* can also incorporate the Romanian *un NP oarecare,* despite the special interaction of the indefinite with negation.

4.4 Focus in negated contexts.

One issue that I have only mentioned briefly is that fact that in Romanian, whenever *oarecare* can appear in the scope of clausemate negation, it will either have to be the case that negation receives focal stress or that *oarecare* itself is focused. Consider again (33) and (34) above which I repeat as (58) and (59):

(58) *Maria NU poate să resolve o problemă* ***oarecare.***
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

(59) *Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă OARECARE.*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

Cases like the ones exemplified in (58) fall under what Geurts and van der Standt (1998) following Gussenhoven (1984), have dubbed *polarity focus*: in such a context, the proposition embedded under the negation operator is treated as given and the point of (58) is simply to deny a previously mentioned utterance (see also Szabolcsi 2004)[10].

In (59), focus on *oarecare* retains the free choice and the sentence simply negates that any problem in our domain is such that Mary can solve that problem; also, (59) implicates that Mary can actually solve a subset of the given set of problems.

Note, moreover, that if focused *un NP oarecare* is embedded under other DE contexts as well, the free choice effect is also maintained[11]:

(60) Restrictions of universal quantifiers
Fiecare copil care poate rezolva o problemă OARECARE din manual va primi premiu
every kid that can solve a problem whatever from textbook will get prize
'Every kid that can solve no matter what problem from the textbook will get a prize.'

(61) Few
Puţini copii pot rezolva o problemă OARECARE din manual.
few kids can solve a problem whatever from textbook
'Few kids are able to solve no matter what problem from the textbook.'

(62) Dubitatives:
Mă îndoiesc că Maria poate să rezolve o problemă OARECARE din manual.
me doubt that Mary can solve a problem whatever from textbook
'I doubt that Mary can solve just any problem in the textbook.'

(63) Negative factives:
Imi pare rău că Maria rezolvă o problemă OARECARE din manual
me seems bad that Mary solves a problem whatever from textbook
'I am sorry that Mary solves no matter which problem from the textbook.'

In what follows, I will only concentrate on the special relation between focused *oarecare* and the negation operator. An account of the exact interaction between focused *oarecare* and other downward entailing contexts will remain an issue for further research.

*4.4.1 Negation with focused **oarecare***

Consider again (59), repeated as (64), in which *oarecare* is focused:

(64) *Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă OARECARE.*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

In (64), it is not the case that every problem in the set is such that Mary is able to solve it. As such, I suggest, (64) is to be read as an instance of implicature denial.

These facts recall denials of scalar implicatures, as discussed by Horn (1989), among others. Scalar implicatures arise whenever expressions that may be viewed as part of an informational scale

are involved. (Grice 1989, Horn 1989, Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2001). For instance, (positive) quantifiers are ordered on an informational scale as follows:

(65) some<many<most<every.

When a speaker uses a term that is ranked lower on the scale, then, by an exploitation of Grice's maxim conversational maxims, an implicature arises to the effect that a statement that would have included a higher term does not hold. The computational process involved in the derivation of an implicature can be illustrated with an example. Consider (66):

(66) a. What did you break?
b. I broke some of your plates.
c. I broke all your plates.

When the speaker answers the question in (66a) using (66b), the hearer will reason as follows: (i) The speaker chose to say b, which is a weaker statement than c; (ii) c entails b; (iii) if the speaker knew that c, she/he would have said so, in observance of the maxim of quantity. Hence: it is not the case, given what the speaker knows or believes, that (66c) holds. Therefore, the speaker was entitled to use (66b).

When a weak scalar item is embedded under negation, the scalar implicature is suspended. Consider (67):

(67) a. It is not the case that I broke some of your plates.
b. I broke all your plates.

The implicature arising by uttering "I broke some of your plates" is “it is false that I broke all of your plates". Had the scalar implicature been projected in the presence of a negative operator, (67b) above could have been a possible continuation of (67a). However, this is not what the sentence in (67a) means. What it means is that I did not break any of your plates.

When, however, negation is used as *denial*, the continuation in (67b) is possible. Denial will serve to reject a generalized conversational implicature: by saying (67a) the speaker conveys that it is not the case that it is false that he broke all of the plates; hence, the speaker broke all of them.

One characteristic property of negation when used as denial is that it is neither an active trigger of NPIs, nor an inhibitor of PPIs (cf. Horn 1989: 97, Szabolcsi 2004). Thus, (68) below, containing a PPI, is fine. Crucially, 'some' receives focal stress:

(68) I did not break SOME of your plates. I broke all of them.

Similarly, the presence of focused *oarecare* in (64) above does not lead to an ungrammatical statement. As long as negation functions as denial, the focused PPI is retained.

Let us see in more detail how negation works to reject the conversational implicature derived from a sentence containing the domain widening indefinite *un NP oarecare* in Romanian:

Consider again (64):

(64) *Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă OARECARE* .
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
‘Mary cannot solve just any problem.’

(64) is understood as denying the implicature that there is no problem in the relevant problem set that Mary cannot solve. That is, the requirement that for every proposition p in the alternative set S= {*Mary can solve problem 1*, *Mary can solve problem 2*}, there is a world w in which p be true, no longer holds. Note, moreover, that the sentence cannot mean that Mary cannot solve any problem. Rather, it implicates that only a (certain) subset of the problems in our domain is such that Mary can solve any problem in that subset.

Why would *oarecare* need to be focused, then?

I argue that the key to understanding this effect of focus lies in the Background Presupposition Rule, as suggested by Geurts and van der Sandt (1998):

(69) *The Background Presupposition Rule.*
Whenever focus gives rise to a background λx.φ (x), there is a presupposition to the effect that λx.φ(x) holds of some individual.
(Geurts and van der Standt, 1998, 1)

By focusing *oarecare,* a background-presupposition structure is created, to the effect that the background is understood as presupposed. What this means for our example is that when focus is placed on *oarecare* in such contexts, it is already presupposed that the proposition *Mary can solve x* holds of some problem x in our domain of discourse.

Two phenomena interact here: (i) focusing *oarecare,* we make an existential claim about an individual in our domain; (ii) using negation, we deny the conversational implicature arising through the use of the domain widening indefinite *oarecare*: there IS a restriction as to problems that Mary can solve. Moreover, by denying the free choice implicature arising with the use of *un NP oarecare,* the speaker is in the position to continue (64) by employing either an indefinite that does not induce domain widening, or a definite description:

(70) *Maria poate să rezolve problema din capitolul 1.*
Mary can SĂ solve problem.the from chapter.the 1
'Mary can solve the problem from chapter 1'

I do not have at this moment a fully worked out proposal that can offer an implementation of the mechanism of implicature denial in a formal framework. However, I tentatively suggest that a promising line of investigation could be the interaction of a semantics of focus as exemplified above and a proposal put forth by Chierchia (2004, 2006), who argues that certain pragmatic processes, such as implicatures, are computed recursively and compositionally, on a par with the computation of meaning.

Chierchia's (2004, 2006) suggestion is that certain implicatures are not added in after the meaning of the sentence has been computed, as it is generally assumed in a Neo Gricean framework, but rather, they must be added in at some point in the computational process[12]. With implicature denials, the suggestion would then be that negation operates after the conversational implicature has been added to the meaning of the sentence.

Consider again (64):

(64) *Maria nu poate să resolve o problemă OARECARE .*
Mary not can SĂ solve a problem whatever
'Mary cannot solve just any problem.'

Under the present set up, before negation is factored in, the modal operates on the set of propositional alternatives S = {*Mary solves problem x*, *Mary solves problem y*, etc} introduced by the indefinite. The semantics of the modal is telling us that there is some accessible world w, such that one of the propositions in the alternative set S is true.

The conversational implicature that arises is that the alternatives created by *un NP oarecare* are then distributed over the accessible worlds: for every propositional alternative p in S, there is an accessible world w in which p is true.

At this step, we factor in the implicature, and the total meaning of the sentence would be that:

(71) *Mary can solve a problem and every problem is such that she can solve it.*

Negating (71) does not yet ensure that there exists indeed a problem that Mary can solve. If the suggestion that focus gives rise to an existential presupposition is on the right track, then accommodating the presupposition above the negation operator might give us the desired result. Negating (71) would then mean: *Mary can solve a problem and it is not the case that every problem is such that she can solve it*, which is exactly what we want. I leave the technical details of implementing such a proposal for further research.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have focused on the free choice interpretation of the Romanian indefinite *un NP oarecare.*

I have shown that *un NP oarecare* is a domain widening indefinite, which, as Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) have argued for German *irgendein,* introduces into the discourse a maximal set of individual alternatives (Hamblin sets). These alternatives keep expanding until they meet an operator that can select them. In this system, modals operate on sets of propositions. I have shown that, in the spirit of Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) account, the free choice interpretation in a sentence containing *un NP oarecare* arises via a conversational implicature.

I have also pointed out an apparent problem, which, at first sight, constituted a challenge for the claim that the free choice effect is a conversational implicature. Recall that implicatures are normally suspended in the immediate scope of negation and in other downward entailing (DE) contexts. Trying to see how *un NP oarecare* behaves in such environments (and thus trying to test whether using a domain widening indefinite instead of a regular indefinite or a definite description does indeed yield a conversationally implicated free choice effect), we saw that un *NP oarecare* cannot appear under clausemate negation unless it is focused. We have shown that this is not an actual problem for the analysis, because the resistance of unfocused *un NP oarecare* to clausemate negation follows from independent principles: *un NP oarecare* is a PPI in Romanian. As such, *un NP oarecare* is actually happy under other DE contexts; when the indefinite occurs in these environments, the free choice effect disappears. Romanian data can thus be nicely integrated in Kratzer and Shimoyama's (2002) system.

In section 4.4 I discussed in more detail the interaction between focused *oarecare* and negation in Romanian. I have suggested that when focused *oarecare* co-occurs with clausemate negation, the sentence is to be read as an instance of implicature denial. Focus on *oarecare* in such contexts creates a background-presupposition structure, to the effect that an existential instantiation of the background is presupposed. As such, a speaker that uses negation to deny the generalized conversational implicature of a statement in which a domain widening indefinite is employed

signals that as long as only a subset of our set of individual alternatives could satisfy the claim, the use of the indefinite *oarecare* is not appropriate.

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[1] Kratzer's recent work (2003) has called into question the (Neo-)Gricean theory of the cluster of phenomena known as generalized conversational implicature. This paper uses the term descriptively and remains agnostic as to its best theoretical treatment.

[2] Farkas (2002), following Horn (1999) calls it a *quodlibetic indefinite.*

[3] Some speakers, however, cannot get the free choice reading with *un NP oarecare* in certain modal contexts, although they do get the pejorative reading. This, however, is a matter of dialectal variation, which would suggest that in this dialect, the pejorative and the free choice reading are not related, at least, not in this way.

[4] I am grateful to Anna Szabolcsi (pc) for suggesting this possibility to me.

[5] I ignore for now contexts in which unstressed *oarecare* appears embedded under stressed *nu* (*not).*

[6] One empirical challenge that the present account faces, which was noticed by Paul Elbourne (pc), is that it is sometimes possible to use a regular indefinite instead of a domain widening indefinite and still get the free choice effect. For instance, we could imagine a situation in which, say, Mary has big financial problems and the only way out is for her to get a job. In such a context, a speaker can say:

(i) Ia-ţi **o** slujbă şi scapi.
Take-cl.2nd dat. a fem.s job and be saved.
Get a job and you will be saved.

Although in this example a regular indefinite, and not a domain widening indefinite has been used, there seems to be a strong tendency among speakers to interpret the sentence with a free choice signature: *given the current state of affairs* (your financial situation) any job will do. As such, there is nothing in the semantics of a regular indefinite (*un/o* or *ein)* that says that there is a restriction on possible choices, and the same effect is obtained irrespective of the type of indefinite employed.

Clearly, the phenomenon of free choice is more intricate than it may seem at first sight. Not only do languages differ with respect to the kind of FCIs they employ (sometimes these don't even overlap in distribution), but also even within that same language we notice different ways of signaling the free choice effect. In Romanian, for instance, the indefinite *un NP oarecare* is not the only free choice item in the language; the free choice field covered for English by *any,* bears in Romanian the signature of two items: *orice* and *oricare.* Against such a background, the fact that free choice effects can also be obtained in some situations when a regular indefinite and not a domain widening is employed, comes as no surprise. This is, however, a weak statement and it does not do any justice to Elbourne's objection. I leave the issue for further investigation.

[7] Kratzer (2006) and Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) only discuss negative sentences (with negative quantifiers) and dubitatives, but Tom Leu and Philipp Angermeyer (pc) have confirmed the facts for other DE contexts such as restrictions of universal quantifiers, the scope of 'few', negative factives, as well as for other contexts that license *any,* like questions.

[8] As such, the indefinite is in complementary distribution with the strict NPI *nici un*.

[9] Interestingly, if the conditional is interpreted as a warning or threat in Romanian, some speakers say that *oarecare* needs to be obligatorily focused:

(i) Dacă te culci cu un bărbat OARECARE din cartier, mă supăr.
if refl.2nd sleep.2sg with a man whatever from neighborhood, refl.1st get upset
If you sleep with just any man in the neighborhood, I will get upset.

In the absence of focus, the sentence is considered ungrammatical. For the moment, I do not have an account of why this would be the case. I leave the issue for further investigation.

[10] Horn (1989) analyses these cases as metalinguistic negation.

[11] The 'restoring' effect of focus on the availability of the free choice reading as a conversational implicature in downward entailing contexts is actually not an isolated fact about Romanian. The same effect of focus is noted for the German indefinite *irgendein* as well (Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) Kratzer (2006), A. Adli (pc), T. Leu (pc)).

[12] The tool he uses in implementing this idea is an implicature-freezing operator σ, which enables one to have embedded implicatures in sites where one would not expect to find them. Chierchia argues that the implicature freezing operator is,

in fact, fully analogous to that of Rooth's (1992) focus operator ' ~ ' ; while the latter marks the point at which focal alternatives are factored into the meaning of the sentence, the former marks the point at which implicatures are added.

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